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Abstract
A criticism of consociational power sharing as an institutional response to violent conflict is that 
it buttresses rather than ameliorates the underlying (linguistic, religious or ethno-national) divide, 
hence prohibiting the emergence of new dimensions of political competition (such as economic 
left-right or moral liberal-conservative dimensions) that are characteristic of ‘normal’ societies. 
We test this argument in the context of the illustrative Northern Ireland case, using data from 
expert coding of party policy documents and opinion data derived from two Voter Advice 
Applications (VAAs). We find evidence for a moral liberal-conservative dimension of politics in 
addition to the ethno-national dimension. Hence, we caution against assuming that consociational 
polities are unidimensional.
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One response to violent conflict in deeply divided places is to implement consociational 
power-sharing arrangements. Political parties from the opposing groups in society enter 
an inclusive coalition government, and each group is given a right of veto over important 
legislation that may adversely affect their particular community. There is quite a heated 
normative debate over the merits and demerits of the power-sharing approach to conflict 
resolution.1 Proponents argue that it is a system that is most likely to generate a secure and 
peaceful polity in which all groups are included in decision-making. Critics argue that 
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because power sharing is based on recognising and giving veto rights to distinct rival 
social groups, the institutional arrangements simply cement and prolong the underlying 
division in society. Accordingly, other possible political debates that are associated with 
‘normal’ societies are prohibited from developing, leaving post-conflict societies forever 
languishing in divide-based politics.
However, there are counter-arguments, suggesting that implementing consociational 
government may enable other dimensions to emerge. First, power-sharing arrangements 
may incentivise movement by formerly violent parties in a moderate direction in order to 
gain votes and executive power in proportion to those votes. This may lead to within-bloc 
party similarity and a perceived need by parties to differentiate themselves on other pol-
icy dimensions.2 Second, arriving at a negotiated consociational settlement may signify 
acceptance of the legitimacy of the state by all major relevant actors and acceptance of the 
legitimacy of the resulting power-sharing government. This resulting government must 
make decisions on a range of policy themes, hence raising the salience of those non-
divide issue dimensions.3
Here, we focus on the illustrative case of post-2007 Northern Ireland as a fully func-
tioning consociational power-sharing polity and examine the dimensionality of policy 
space.4 Are the critics of consociation right in arguing that there is likely to be only one 
dimension of competition? Specifically, is the underlying ethno-national divide (between 
Protestant unionists who favour Northern Ireland remaining part of the United Kingdom 
and Catholic nationalists who favour a united Ireland) the only strong attitudinal dimen-
sion in citizens’ minds and the only dimension driving party competition and vote choice? 
Or, do Northern Ireland citizens and parties adopt distinct positions on other dimensions 
of competition and is vote behaviour driven by these issue areas? Despite often being 
characterised politically as a land of ‘green’ versus ‘orange’ issues, a cursory following of 
post-2007 Northern Ireland current affairs suggests that economics and morality are core 
aspects of political debate. Welfare reform has divided the parties and has brought the 
political institutions to the brink of collapse. The issue of same-sex marriage has led to the 
resignation of a minister and much inter-party disagreement on an associated ‘conscience 
clause’ bill. Are these issues indicative of important underlying dimensions of competi-
tion on economic (left-right) and moral (liberal-conservative) matters?
We begin by elaborating our general expectations regarding policy dimensionality 
under Northern Ireland’s consociational conditions and specifying our research questions. 
We then describe our sources of data (expert coding that we conducted of party policy 
documents and opinion data from two Voter Advice Applications (VAAs) that we pro-
duced). We then report the extent to which non-ethno-national attitudinal dimensions 
structure citizens’ attitudes and the extent to which the political parties offer distinct posi-
tions on these dimensions. Furthermore, we examine whether citizens choose parties on 
the basis of non-ethno-national dimensions. In theory, if the economic or moral dimen-
sions were very politically salient for citizens and parties were different from each other 
on these dimensions, citizens might vote ‘across the divide’, with Catholics voting for one 
of the unionist parties (or Protestants voting for one of the nationalist parties). However, 
given the rarity of cross ethnic voting, we examine the possible electoral importance of a 
non-ethno-national dimension in two ways: Does it predict within-bloc voting (i.e. which 
particular nationalist party a Catholic votes for, or which particular unionist party a 
Protestant votes for) and does it predict outside-bloc voting (do Catholics and Protestants 
who vote for the bi-communal Alliance party do so on the basis of ideological dimensions 
such as economics and morality)?
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In short, we find that – in addition to the underlying ethno-national dimension – a 
moral liberal-conservative dimension is a strongly structured attitudinal dimension. Also, 
parties offer choice on this dimension and voters vote on the basis of it (in terms of 
within-bloc and outside-bloc voting).5 These findings caution against the assumption that 
consociational power sharing necessarily leads to a unidimensional polity and lends cre-
dence to the idea that other policy dimensions may also play a role. We elaborate the 
implications of our findings both for our understanding of how consociation influences 
policy space and for normative debates on the desirability or otherwise of power sharing 
as an institutional response to violent conflict.
Non-Ethno-National Dimensions
We investigate the extent to which dimensions of competition, such as economic left-
right, liberal-conservative and pro- versus anti-EU, which are salient in ‘mainland Britain’ 
(Evans et al., 1996; Heath et al., 1994), operate in Northern Ireland.6
Economic Left-Right
Lipset and Rokkan (1967) are the departure point for many scholars of political cleavages 
and policy dimensions. They identify a range of fundamental cleavages in European 
industrialised societies, arguably the most influential of which is the economic ideologi-
cal divide between Left and Right. This derived from the owner versus worker (or social 
class) cleavage, as more economically marginalised sectors of society attempted to secure 
a redistribution of wealth and influence from the privileged classes and saw the state as 
the instrument to accomplish this redistribution. This left-right divide is ubiquitous in the 
international study of policy dimensions and has long been seen as the core divide in 
British politics. In the Northern Ireland context, some previous research has examined the 
economic left-right basis of citizens’ attitudes, party positions and vote choice. For exam-
ple, the Gilland-Lutz and Farrington (2006) study based on a 2003 survey of candidates 
and the Benoit and Laver (2006) study based on a 2003 expert survey paint a fairly similar 
picture of Northern Ireland party positions. On the economy, Sinn Féin (SF) is the most 
‘left-wing’ and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) the most ‘right-wing’, with the remaining 
three parties – the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the (nationalist) Social Democratic 
and Labour Party (SDLP) and (the cross-community) Alliance (All) – clustered around 
the centre ground.
In terms of citizens’ economic left-right attitudes and the relationship between these 
attitudes and vote choice, Evans and Duffy (1997) examined pooled 1989–1991 data 
from the Northern Ireland Social Attitudes survey (NISAS). A left-right ideology meas-
ure was generated from five items which displayed a good level of internal consistency 
and was, among Protestants, a strong predictor of party preference (with the DUP associ-
ated with more left-wing voters). A study by Tilley et al. (2008) used pooled 1989–2004 
data from NISAS and the Northern Ireland Life and Times survey (NILTS) and found 
that economic left-right attitudes (using three items which form ‘a fairly internally 
coherent scale’) did not predict vote choice for either Protestants or Catholics. Similar 
findings were arrived at by John Garry (2009). A further study by Tilley and Evans 
(2011), however, did find that economic left-right (using a two-item scale for 1989–2006 
NISAS/NILTS data) predicted Protestant vote choice (again with the DUP linked with 
more left-wing voters). In short, the findings suggest a reasonably strong structure to 
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citizens’ left-right attitudes but inconsistency regarding the relationship between this 
dimension and party preference.
However, it may be that, post-2007, economic attitudes more sharply delineate party 
positions and more strongly structure citizens’ attitudes and determine vote choice, given 
the degree of prominence afforded economic issues. Most notably, since 2012 the 
Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly have been clearly divided over the implemen-
tation of welfare reform measures introduced by the Westminster government. SF has 
adopted a staunchly left-wing stance, refusing to implement cuts to social welfare allow-
ances and vetoing the budget. The Executive parties, along with the British and Irish 
governments, have participated in several high-profile initiatives aimed at reaching agree-
ment on the issue, the most substantial of which resulted in the 2014 Stormont House 
Agreement. Failure to reach a compromise – primarily between the two largest parties, 
the DUP and SF – brought the power-sharing institutions at Stormont to the brink of col-
lapse on numerous occasions. As a result, the issue of welfare reform and the parties’ 
differing stances on how best to proceed has been a consistent and dominant feature of 
political news coverage since 2012.
Liberal-Conservative
In contrast to Lipset and Rokkan’s materialist owners versus workers cleavage, Ronald 
Inglehart (1977, 1990) has highlighted the emergence of what he terms post-materialist 
values among the younger generation, leading to the growth of left-libertarian lifestyle 
movements that champion issues such as the environment, women’s rights, gay rights 
and anti-racism. Similarly, authors such as Scott Flanagan (1987) contrast a ‘new poli-
tics’, which is defined by a divide between libertarian (‘new Left’) and authoritarian 
(‘new Right’) values,7 from the ‘old politics’, the focal point of which is the role of the 
state in the economy and which separates the (economic) Left from the (economic) 
Right. Marks et al. (2006) propose that the European political space is defined by two 
dimensions: one (economic) Left-Right dimension and one ‘Tan/Gal’ dimension. Here, 
Tan refers to ‘traditionalism/authority/nationalism’, while Gal refers to ‘green/alterna-
tive/libertarian’ (Marks et al., 2006).
On this non-economic dimension in Northern Ireland, studies by Gilland-Lutz and 
Farrington (2006) and Benoit and Laver (2006) showed that in terms of socio-moral 
issues, SF and Alliance are the two most liberal parties, the UUP and SDLP occupy the 
middle ground, while the DUP is the most conservative. Regarding the measurement of 
citizens’ attitudes on this dimension, and its relationship with party preference, Mitchell 
and Tilley (2004) used a four-item scale to measure moral issues (on sexuality and abor-
tion) and found reasonable internal consistency, suggesting a fairly well-structured attitu-
dinal dimension. Focusing on the 1991–1998 period, the authors found that moral 
conservativism increasingly predicted Protestant support for the DUP rather than UUP. 
Garry (2009), using a single-item measure relating to attitudes to homosexuality, did not 
find evidence of the liberal-conservative distinction explaining within-bloc voting. Again, 
the findings are inconsistent.
In addition to economic left-right, a liberal-conservative dimension may also be oper-
ating in post-2007 Northern Ireland politics. A cluster of moral issues have dominated 
contemporary political headlines in Northern Ireland (for discussion, see Tonge and 
Evans, 2015: 128–131). The region’s exceptional legislative stance on abortion, com-
pared to other constituent parts of the United Kingdom, has been a source of sustained 
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public and political debate. The opening of an abortion advice clinic in Belfast in 2012 
proved especially controversial, dominating the news agenda for several months and 
prompting a series of high-profile court cases. In March 2013, the Assembly narrowly 
rejected a DUP and SDLP proposal to outlaw private abortion clinics. A further attempt 
by the DUP to tighten abortion law in Northern Ireland was defeated in June 2015. On this 
occasion, the margin of defeat was just two votes, while later that same month an unsuc-
cessful bid to challenge Northern Ireland’s exemption from the 1967 Abortion Act was 
launched at Belfast’s High Court.
Recent years have also witnessed a notable degree of attention centred on the issue of 
equality for the lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) community in Northern 
Ireland and, on a related note, the protection of religious rights. A decision by a DUP 
Health Minister in 2011 to maintain a ban on gay men donating blood – irrespective of its 
lifting in the rest of the United Kingdom – provoked much public debate and political 
rancour. An even bigger furore, however, has surrounded the issue of same-sex marriage 
in Northern Ireland. The refusal of a baking company in 2014 to provide a customer with 
a product bearing a message supporting same-sex marriage, on account of the owner’s 
religious faith, has captured both public and political attention to a considerable degree. 
In response to the bakery owners being taken to court on grounds of discrimination, the 
DUP has sought to introduce a ‘conscience clause’ protecting business owners – a move 
which has been met with overwhelming opposition from other parties and the Equality 
Commission for Northern Ireland. In a political environment dominated by this colloqui-
ally dubbed ‘gay cake’ row, the DUP’s Jim Wells was forced to resign as Health Minister 
following controversial remarks about the suitability of homosexuals to foster children. 
Again, this episode, which occurred on the Westminster campaign trail, generated exten-
sive media and political scrutiny.
European Union
In addition to the economic left-right and the liberal-conservative divides, we also focus 
on the pro- versus anti-EU issue dimension which is of considerable salience across 
Europe and particularly in the United Kingdom in the context of the referendum on UK 
membership of the EU. The EU debate may be linked to a more profound divide within 
society. For example, Kriesi et al. (2006) identify a recent societal cleavage between 
‘winners’ and ‘losers’ of globalisation, arguing that ‘losers’ tend to take a position of 
cultural demarcation by rejecting immigration and European integration. In a similar 
vein, Ford and Goodwin (2014) claim that the United Kingdom Independence Party 
(UKIP), which garnered 12.6% in the 2015 UK general election, draws its support pri-
marily from what they describe as ‘left behind’ sectors of society, typically older, male 
blue-collar workers who have become victims of economic globalisation. Referring also 
to the recent growth of UKIP, some UK commentators have proposed a corresponding 
divide between ‘communitarians’ and ‘cosmopolitans’. The former (the group to which 
most UKIP supporters belong) are wary of change, prefer continuity and stability and 
feel that ‘those close to us matter more than people who are far away’ (Goodhart, 2014), 
while the latter are mainly metropolitan liberals who embrace change, cultural diversity 
and geographical mobility.
The issue of the EU has long been a core element of intra- and inter-party debate in 
Britain, and has also been studied in the specific Northern Ireland context. Gilland-Lutz 
and Farrington (2006) and Benoit and Laver (2006) studies found that the DUP is the 
498 Political Studies 65 (2)
most stridently Eurosceptic of the parties, followed by the UUP and SF. The SDLP and 
Alliance are both pro-EU, with the former party the most extreme in their position. As far 
as citizens’ attitudes and vote choice are concerned, Garry (2012) found at the 2009 
European Parliament election that in the nationalist bloc SF voters were more sceptical 
than SDLP voters (although there were no such distinctions between the DUP and UUP 
support bases).
Specific Research Questions
Our specific research questions that we now address are as follows:
1. In addition to the ethno-national dimension, is there any other strong attitudinal 
dimension – such as economic left-right, liberal-conservative or pro- versus anti-
EU – that structures citizens’ political attitudes?
2. If there is, do the parties offer a distinct choice on this additional dimension?
3. If there is and parties do offer a distinct choice on this additional attitudinal 
dimension, does this attitudinal dimension determine vote choice?
The parties we consider are those that are significant insofar as they garnered at least 
5% of the vote in both the 2011 elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly and in the 
2015 UK general election. This leaves us with five parties: the DUP, SF, the SDLP, the 
UUP and the Alliance.
Data
We generate data on citizens’ attitudes from a VAA (WhoGetsMyVoteUK) that we devel-
oped and applied in Northern Ireland in the run up to the 2015 Westminster election.8 
VAAs are online applications that enable their users to compare their policy preferences 
with those of political parties or election candidates in order to help them decide how to 
vote (for an overview of VAAs, see Garzia and Marschall (2012)). Users are presented 
with a number of issue statements to which they can express varying degrees of agreement 
or disagreement. Parties and candidates are also assigned positions with respect to each 
issue statement and the VAA matches users with the parties/candidates, generating a visual 
display (typically a map or bar chart) for users to visualise their proximity with each party 
or candidate. WhoGetsMyVoteUK included 30 issue statements (provided in Appendix 
A1), which were selected according to the following criteria: (1) statements reflected con-
tentious issues in Northern Ireland that had recently (in the previous 2 years or so) received 
attention in the media, (2) parties took clear positions with regard to each issue with some 
parties adopting a favourable position and others a contrary position, (3) evidence sug-
gested that voters were similarly split on each issue and (4) issues were chosen to be as 
varied as possible and to cover most if not all relevant political debates at both national and 
regional (Northern Ireland) level. In WhoGetsMyVoteUK, there were five items relating to 
taxation and spending, two on education, one on healthcare, one on criminal justice, one 
on housing, one on the environment, five on foreign policy/EU affairs, three on immigra-
tion, five on inter-communal relations and six on miscellaneous social issues. For more on 
statement selection and formulation, see the Supplementary Information in the online 
Appendix. For each item, VAA users were presented with six possible answer categories: 
‘completely agree’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘completely disagree’ 
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and ‘no opinion’.9 In the subsequent analysis, all responses were given equal weight, the 
first five categories were considered to represent an ordinal scale, while ‘no opinion’ 
responses were considered as missing values. Users were also given the option of answer-
ing a number of supplementary questions, relating to age, gender, education, party affilia-
tion and vote intention.10 In total, 85% of users completed all the supplementary questions 
and, possibly counter-intuitively, many expressed a clear vote intention and party affilia-
tion, suggesting that – rather than using the tool as advice as to how to vote – some users 
completed the VAA out of interest or to check if the application would confirm their 
already made decisions. It should be noted that all the data we use here from the VAA were 
collected prior to the respondent (VAA user) being given any information regarding where 
parties stand or where the respondent stands on any generated scale. Before analysis, the 
data were cleaned thoroughly to weed out as many ‘rogue’ entries as possible (for cleaning 
methodology, see the online Appendix). After extensive cleaning of data, the dataset 
included 6636 entries (individuals), compared to 9256 entries prior to cleaning, meaning 
that 28.3% of users were excluded in the cleaning process.
Parties’ official positions on each of the 30 issue statements were determined by the 
Delphi method (Dalkey and Helmer, 1963; Gemenis, 2015). First, a panel of experts was 
assigned to independently code all parties on all issue statements. Coders justified each 
one of their estimates by providing information from statements in policy documents, 
party manifestos or other relevant sources. Five coders were assigned to code each party. 
Subsequently, each of the coders’ individual estimates of each party on each item, and 
each coder’s associated justification of each estimate, were fed back to the panel anony-
mously for a second round of coding in which panellists updated their initial codes with 
the help of justifications from their fellow coders. Once the codes converged to a suffi-
cient extent to be deemed consistent (demonstrated by values of Van der Eijk’s (2001) 
measure of agreement A>0.7), the median response was taken as the final estimate. Only 
two rounds of coding were needed.
For our analysis, we rely on both user-generated data and expert coding. We first iden-
tify latent ideological dimensions from user responses to the 30 issue statements. Following 
Gerbing and Anderson (1988), we apply exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to the user 
response data to get a rough idea of what latent dimensions are relevant, then apply con-
firmatory factor analysis (CFA) to evaluate and, if necessary, refine the factors identified 
by EFA (for further details, see the online Appendix). In doing so, we adopt a ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective that assumes that the dimensionality of the political space is fundamentally 
‘demand-generated’ or determined by the orientations of voters. We predetermine neither 
the number of dimensions nor the nature of each dimension. This ‘bottom-up’ approach 
contrasts with the more common practice of defining ideological dimensions a priori (see, 
for example, Marks et al., 2006), but we deem it more appropriate given our emphasis on 
societal cleavages. Having identified latent dimensions, we then plot (1) the position and 
spread of party supporters (from user-generated data) and (2) the party positions as deter-
mined by the expert coders with respect to these dimensions.
Regarding the quality of the data, the following points may be made. In terms of the 
expert coding to generate party positions, our data are arguably of very high quality. Five 
coders were used compared to a single coder as is used in the Comparative Manifesto 
Project (Budge et al., 2001). The interactive, multi-round nature of the Delphi process 
also compares favourably with the methodology used by Chapel Hill (Bakker et al., 
2015), in which a large number of coders code parties, but discrepancies between coders 
are resolved by simply taking the mean values.
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In terms of our data on citizen opinion, which is perhaps more fundamental insofar as 
it determines the ideological dimensions we work with, we face a number of challenges. 
First, it could be argued that the items used in the VAA are determined by the question-
naire designers’ preconceptions of what are the fundamental ideological dimensions and 
that, therefore, the dimensions that are ‘discovered’ merely reflect this latent bias. While 
we cannot remove bias in the question formulation process entirely, we carry out a robust-
ness test by repeating our analysis on a similar dataset that was generated by another VAA 
deployed in Northern Ireland just a year earlier. This was the EUvox VAA that was 
deployed in all 28 EU member states prior to the 2014 elections to the European 
Parliament. This VAA also included 30 issue statements but most were very different; 21 
of them were common to all EU member states and just nine were specific to Northern 
Ireland (to see the statements, refer to the online Appendix). This contrasts with 
WhoGetsMyVoteUK in which all statements were designed to reflect UK/Northern 
Ireland issues. WhoGetsMyVoteUK and EUvox shared just eight common items. If we 
were able to obtain similar results from these two very different sets of issue statements, 
it would confirm the robustness of our findings. After cleaning, the dataset generated by 
EUvox included 2172 entries.
The second challenge is that our sample is not representative. Rather, the respondents 
are self-selected. This leads to problems in terms of generalising from our sample given 
that respondents are unlike the population as a whole in many respects. Typically, VAA 
respondents tend to have above average levels of interest in politics, tend to be younger 
and tend (somewhat) to be male (Marschall, 2014). Perhaps even more importantly, their 
distribution in terms of political orientation may not reflect real world results, potentially 
leading to a skewed sample that cannot reveal the most relevant ideological dimensions 
that define the universe of voters. However, the effect of these obvious disadvantages can 
be minimised by applying a number of sampling techniques to the data. In order to correct 
for possible political bias in our sample, we generate a sample of users that is more or less 
representative of the voting population in terms of vote intention and repeat our analysis 
on this new sample. For additional robustness checks to account for bias on the other vari-
ables, we divide the overall sample of VAA users into a number of different sub-samples, 
based on age, education and political interest, and perform the analysis on each sub-group 
separately.
Results
Attitudinal Dimensions
When EFA is applied to citizens’ responses to the survey items in WhoGetsMyVoteUK, 
the ‘elbow’ appears to be located on the fifth eigenvalue, suggesting that there are four 
relevant dimensions in the political space. When we feed the outputs of the EFA into CFA 
and then eliminate items until the model satisfies our goodness-of-fit criteria,11 we find 
that one dimension contains economic issues (tax, spending, state/private sector involve-
ment in public services and the economy, fracking, university tuition fees, size of the 
public sector, redistribution of wealth and workers’ rights), one cultural-moral issues 
(drug use, gay marriage, euthanasia, role of Christianity/religion), one sectarian issues 
(use of flags, parades, legacy of ‘the Troubles’, union with the Republic of Ireland) and 
one issues on Europe (desirability of membership, EU powers, membership of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)). Table 1 (below) shows the individual 
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items that load onto each dimension, as well as the goodness-of-fit indices. Items are 
identified by the number assigned to each item in the table in Appendix A1.
Looking now at the consistency of each of the dimensions identified, if the ethno-
national sectarian divide is the dominant dimension in Northern Irish society, we would 
expect that the items that belong to this dimension form a stronger scale (in terms of 
internal consistency) than the items that load onto the other dimensions. Performing 
Mokken Scale Analysis (MSA) on the items that load onto each dimension in each data-
set, we see that while the Loevinger H coefficient, which measures the interdependence 
of items in a given scale, is indeed greater for the sectarian scale, the cultural-moral scale 
is also quite strong (see Table 2).
Specifically, the sectarian scale conforms to Mokken’s ‘strong’ category (H>0.5), 
while the cultural-moral scale is ‘medium’ in strength (H>0.4). The EU dimension is a 
‘weak’ scale (H>0.3) that includes just three items, but one of these violates the ‘crit’ 
threshold for monotone homogeneity. (For more on the criteria used in MSA, see the 
online Appendix.) The economic dimension is the weakest and does not even reach 
Mokken’s minimum level of acceptability (H<0.3). Overall, therefore, on the demand 
side (i.e. from the side of citizens who use the VAA), it would seem that the sectarian 
dimension is not the only relevant one. In particular, the cultural-moral dimension repre-
sents a major divide within Northern Irish society and the economic and Europe dimen-
sions also have some (albeit less) discriminatory power.
Unfortunately, however, our sample is subject to quite a strong political bias. Out of 
3059 users who expressed a clear vote intention, 1140 intended to vote for the Alliance 
Party (fifth-placed in terms of votes in the 2015 elections), while just 324 intended to vote 
for the first-placed party, the DUP (see Table 3). To control for this, we generate a new 
sample that includes all 324 DUP voters, 310 SF voters, 180 UUP voters, 176 SDLP 
voters, 108 Alliance voters, 32 UKIP voters, 29 Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) voters 
and 82 voters of other parties or independents. We generate this sample by randomly 
selecting entries from each group of voters. The new sample reflects the population as a 
whole in terms of how real votes were cast in 2015 and is augmented by a further 934 VAA 
users who declared either that they did not intend to vote or were undecided (in order to 
represent the 43% of voters who did not vote). Applying the above analysis to the new 
sample, the exact same dimensional structure emerges with precisely the same items load-
ing onto each dimension. The goodness-of-fit indices in Table 1 show that this structure 
fits even better with the new sample than with the original one, and MSA (Table 2) pro-
duces similar or improved values for Loevinger’s H (with the moral-cultural scale 
Table 1. Dimensionality of the Policy Space: Items and Goodness-of-Fit Indices.
Dimension full dataset (n = 6636) Re-sampled dataset (n = 2175)
Economic 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 15
Cultural/Moral 8, 10, 11, 12, 30 8, 10, 11, 12, 30
Sectarian 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
Europe 16, 17, 24 16, 17, 24
Goodness-of-fit indices CFI = 0.952, TLI = 0.945, 
RMSEA = 0.060
CFI = 0.961, TLI = 0.955, 
RMSEA = 0.062
Goodness-of-fit indices include the comparative fit index (CFI), the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) and the root 
mean square error of approximation (RMSEA).
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becoming ‘strong’). This suggests that the model is really quite robust, and the lack of 
representativeness of our sample may not pose as much of a problem as we foresaw.
Table 3 suggests that our dataset is also biased in favour of young, well-educated and 
politically interested voters. For additional robustness checks to estimate the effects of 
these biases, we re-apply our analysis on the following samples: (1) users who do not pay 
a high degree of attention to politics,12 (2) users who did not continue their education 
beyond the age of 19 years and (3) users of 35 years of age or more. These samples are 
designed to counteract the prevailing sample bias. For samples (2) and (3), the dimen-
sions extracted are identical to those extracted from the full sample and the goodness-of-
fit indices remain acceptable, while for sample (1), we need to remove one item from the 
economic scale and one item from the sectarian for the model to satisfy our goodness-of-
fit criteria. However, the other two scales remain identical and the four-dimensional 
model remains valid. That the model still applies when our sample is skewed to make it 
biased in the opposite manner to the overall sample is testimony to its robustness. The 
outputs of these analyses are available in the online Appendix.
Table 2. Mokken Scale Analysis Applied to the Four Policy Dimensions.
Dataset Dimension Loevinger’s H No. crits ⩾ 80
Full dataset (n = 6636) Economic 0.258 0
Cultural-Moral 0.485 0
Sectarian 0.563 0
Europe 0.339 1
Re-sampled dataset 
(n = 2175)
Economic 0.247 0
Cultural-Moral 0.508 0
Sectarian 0.619 0
Europe 0.339 0
Table 3. Characteristics of the Sample.
Sample Number of users
Total 6636
DUP voters 324
SF voters 601
UUP voters 253
SDLP voters 389
Alliance voters 1140
Attention to politics: 0–6 3024
Attention to politics: 7–10 3101
Educated to age 19 years or less 1504
Educated to age 20 years or more 3422
Still in education 1419
Aged less than 35 years 4276
Aged 35 years or more 2086
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party; SF: Sinn Féin; UUP: Ulster Unionist Party; SDLP: Social Democratic and 
Labour Party.
The sums of the categories do not add up to the total number as some users withheld information.
Garry et al. 503
Our final robustness test is designed to control for statement selection bias. Identifying 
latent dimensions from the (second) dataset derived from the EUvox VAA reveals an 
almost identical four-dimensional structure with ‘strong’ (H>0.5) sectarian and cultural-
moral dimensions, a small (two-item) EU dimension and an economic dimension that is 
‘weak’ (H>0.3), but still more coherent than the equivalent dimension derived from the 
WhoGetsMyVoteUK dataset. Details of the dimensions derived from the EUvox dataset 
and the items that load onto them, as well as the outputs from EFA, CFA and MSA, are 
provided in the online Appendix.
Where Do the Parties Stand?
Our next task is to see whether Northern Ireland’s political parties can be distinguished by 
their positions on issues relating to the four dimensions we have identified. We consider 
both the positions of the parties as coded by experts and the positions of those users who 
self-identified as party supporters. We would expect these positions to be broadly similar, 
but given the fact that official party programmes need to be consistent, while voters 
(including party supporters) are often idiosyncratic in their views, we would also expect 
the parties as coded by elites to have clearer (i.e. more polarised) positions than their 
supporters.
To define the position of a party or user with respect to a given dimension, we use their 
positions on those items that we identified above as ‘belonging’ to that dimension by 
virtue of satisfying the goodness-of-fit criteria when CFA is applied and construct a score 
of between zero and one for each dimension. Details of how this is done is provided in the 
online Appendix. We drop one item (Item 17) from the Europe dimension as it appears 
only to load onto this dimension weakly and violates the monotone homogeneity model 
(see above).
Table 4 shows the positions of each party (as coded by experts) with respect to each 
dimension. A value close to 1 represents an economic right-wing, cultural conservative, 
nationalist and pro-EU perspective on the respective dimensions.
Overall, Table 4 appears to show (1) that the DUP, followed by the UUP, takes the 
most right-wing position economically, while SF takes the furthest left position; (2) that 
on the cultural-moral dimension the Alliance, followed by SF, takes the most socially 
liberal position while the DUP takes the most socially conservative position; (3) that 
(unsurprisingly) SF takes the most nationalist position, while the DUP and UUP take the 
most unionist position and (4) that the SDLP and Alliance are the most pro-EU parties, 
while the DUP is the most Eurosceptic.
Table 4. Party Positions by Dimension (Expert Coding).
Party Economic Cultural-Moral Sectarian Europe
DUP 0.536 1.000 0.050 0.625
SF 0.179 0.300 1.000 0.875
SDLP 0.214 0.450 0.600 1.000
UUP 0.464 0.600 0.050 0.750
Alliance 0.286 0.200 0.550 1.000
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party; SF: Sinn Féin; SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party; UUP: Ulster 
Unionist Party.
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To augment this analysis, we also consider the positions of those VAA users who can 
be described as ‘party supporters’. These we define as users who (1) say they feel closest 
to a particular party and (2) said that they would vote for the same party in the forthcom-
ing elections. Of these, we identified 499 SF supporters, 225 DUP supporters, 289 SDLP 
supporters, 173 UUP supporters and 907 Alliance supporters. The mean positions of each 
group of party supporters with respect to all four dimensions are shown in Table 5 (below).
Figure 1 (below) displays these positions graphically but considers only the two 
dimensions that polarise the parties most: the cultural-moral dimension and the sectarian 
dimension. The plots display the means of each group of party supporters with respect to 
these two dimensions (with a square), each party’s position according to the expert coding 
(with an asterisk) and the contour lines that enclose 50% of party supporters.13 We can see 
that, as is the case with the party positions from expert coding, Alliance and SF supporters 
are located on the liberal side of the cultural-moral spectrum, while DUP supporters are 
furthest towards the conservative pole. Similarly, DUP supporters and SF supporters are 
at opposite sides of the sectarian scale. As expected, the official party positions as coded 
by experts appear more polarised than party supporters, given the need of parties to be 
consistent. SF and the SDLP appear to buck this trend somewhat, insofar as their support-
ers appear somewhat more ‘liberal’ than the party position. However, older voters of these 
two long-established parties may be more conservative than younger supporters, who are 
more likely to use the VAA.
Voting Behaviour
So far we have demonstrated that, in addition to the ethno-national dimension, the moral 
liberal-conservative theme is a strong attitudinal dimension when data from citizens (the 
demand side) is examined and parties (the supply side) do offer clear positions on this 
dimension. Do voters, in addition to ethno-national factors, actually vote on the basis of 
the moral dimension? We examine the vote choice of the two community blocs sepa-
rately. First, we examine Protestant vote choice between the two main unionist parties 
(DUP and UUP) and the bi-communal Alliance party. The identification of Protestant and 
Catholic voters was made possible by the inclusion in the VAA of a supplementary ques-
tion that asked for users’ community backgrounds.
A multinomial logistic regression of Protestant respondents’ vote intention between 
the DUP, UUP and Alliance is reported in Table 6, while a similar regression of Catholic 
respondents’ vote intention (between SF, the SDLP and Alliance) is shown in Table 7. Our 
three value dimensions are predictors, and we control for the ethno-national dimension, 
Table 5. Party Positions of Party Supporters by Dimension.
Party Economic Cultural-Moral Sectarian Europe
DUP 0.559 0.664 0.171 0.561
SF 0.323 0.243 0.818 0.843
SDLP 0.381 0.338 0.615 0.842
UUP 0.579 0.536 0.203 0.630
Alliance 0.436 0.254 0.462 0.833
DUP: Democratic Unionist Party; SF: Sinn Féin; SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party; UUP: Ulster 
Unionist Party.
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age, gender and interest in politics. We also control for reported voting behaviour at the 
previous Westminster election (in 2010), enabling our model to identify whether increased 
salience of economic and moral matters, since 2010, influences vote intention in 2015.
We do not find that economic left-right attitudes predict vote choice in either commu-
nity.14 However, we find that liberal-conservative attitudes predict vote choice for both 
communities to a statistically significant extent (p < 0.001). Using the DUP as a reference 
category for Protestant voters, we see that a move away from the conservative pole first 
predicts UUP support and then (as we move towards the liberal pole) Alliance support. 
For Catholic voters, if we use SF as a reference category, a move towards the liberal pole 
predicts a vote for Alliance, while a move towards the conservative poll predicts an SDLP 
vote. The Europe dimension has predictive power only among Protestant voters with a 
pro-EU position predicting an Alliance vote (p < 0.01).
Conclusion
Institutional responses to violent conflict may start from a simple departure point that simi-
larity between humans is desirable or difference is to be celebrated. Accordingly, responses 
may facilitate homogeneity or heterogeneity: encourage assimilation or break-up. 
Accommodationist strategies are towards the recognition-of-difference end of the response 
spectrum, and consociational power sharing is one influential option in the post-conflict 
Figure 1. Party Map.
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democratic designer’s toolkit (see discussion in O’Leary, 2013). While critics bemoan its 
recognition of the underlying divide upon which conflict was based, proponents would 
highlight the system as necessary to provide group-based safeguards at the same time as 
ending violence. Proponents would also downplay the likelihood of the system cementing 
a divide-based dimension of competition, while critics are more wary. It is the role of 
empirical analysis to help identify whether or not multidimensional politics operates in the 
context of power sharing.
We set up a fairly challenging set of criteria for the observation of multidimensional 
politics. From the demand side, a dimension must exhibit strong internal coherence as 
evidenced in the inter-correlation of citizens’ responses to survey items related to a par-
ticular theme, and the dimension must be demonstrably distinct from the dimension asso-
ciated with the underlying divide. From the supply side, parties must offer distinct 
positions as measured by a set of expert coders using published party statements on the 
same issues that cluster for citizens on that theme. Third, regarding the interplay of supply 
and demand there must be evidence of citizens’ vote choice being determined by the issue 
area, controlling for the underlying divide and previous vote choice.
From the Northern Ireland example, the moral liberal-conservative divide meets these 
quite demanding criteria. This suggests that there is scope for multidimensional politics 
to operate under power-sharing conditions. Ethno-national disputes still bedevil Northern 
Ireland politics, and ‘legacy’ issues associated with flags, parading and the past are far 
Table 6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Protestant Vote: (DUP = Reference 
Category).
UUP Alliance
 B SE B SE
Economic left (0–1) −1.399 0.777 −0.931 0.881
Moral conservative (0–1) −1.486** 0.527 −5.184*** 0.624
Eurosceptic (0–1) −0.651 0.516 −1.989** 0.648
Controls
 Nationalist-Unionist (0–1) −2.734** 0.960 −9.399*** 1.153
 Attention to politics (0–1) 0.132 0.496 0.211 0.569
 Age 0.023* 0.010 0.021 0.011
 Female 0.464 0.261 0.597* 0.294
Vote behaviour 2010 (DUP = Ref category)
 UUP −2.793*** 0.377 −1.780*** 0.462
 Alliance −1.093* 0.511 −3.264*** 0.449
 Other party −1.813*** 0.424 −1.518** 0.524
 Did not vote −0.969* 0.415 −1.327** 0.430
 Other response −1.613*** 0.354 −0.666 0.444
Intercept 10.251** 1.420 17.361*** 1.673
SE: standard error; DUP: Democratic Unionist Party; UUP: Ulster Unionist Party; SE: standard error.
n = 1073.
cox and snell psuedo r-square = 0.61.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p < 0.001.
Note: the difference between the UUP and Alliance on morality is statistically significant at 0.001 and on EU 
at 0.03.
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from being resolved. But this continuing political disagreement over issues associated 
with the nationalist-unionist divide may coexist with other issue areas. This is not to say 
that members of one community are ‘crossing the divide’ and voting for parties from the 
rival community, but within-bloc and outside-bloc voting is driven by the moral dimen-
sion and that dimension is strongly coherent. Indeed, events since the 2015 Westminster 
election suggest that the cultural-moral dimension – and the issue of gay rights in particu-
lar – will remain salient for both citizens and parties (posing the challenge of how parties 
deal in the future with this ‘second dimension’ of competition (Elias et al., 2015)). On 2 
November 2015, the Northern Ireland Assembly voted narrowly in favour of same-sex 
marriage. The motion was, however, controversially vetoed by the DUP. Subsequent 
comments by UUP leader Mike Nesbitt on the issue also suggest a potential liberalising 
of his party’s stance, which would create greater distinction within the unionist bloc 
(BBC, 2015). So, the implications of this analysis for normative debates about whether or 
not consociation is a good institutional response to violent conflict is that, at least in the 
exemplary Northern Ireland case, there is current evidence that a non-ethno-national 
dimension of competition is observable and hence the concerns of critics that the institu-
tions cement the ethno-national divide seem to be overplayed.
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Table 7. Multinomial Logistic Regression Predicting Catholic Vote: (Sinn Féin = Reference 
Category).
SDLP Alliance
 B SE B SE
Economic left (0–1) 0.016 0.762 −1.177 0.777
Moral conservative (0–1) 2.306*** 0.715 −2.980*** 0.847
Eurosceptic (0–1) −1.283 0.741 −0.274 0.720
Controls
 Nationalist-unionist (0–1) 7.387*** 0.898 9.293*** 0.964
Attention to politics 
(0–1)
1.178* 0.506 1.515** 0.536
Age −0.005 0.012 0.038*** 0.012
Female 0.718*** 0.255 0.616* 0.264
Vote behaviour 2010 (SF = Ref category)
 SDLP −3.596*** 0.337 −1.543*** 0.366
 Alliance −0.740 0.754 −3.683*** 0.487
 Other party −1.631** 0.589 −1.461** 0.564
 Did not vote −1.570*** 0.379 −1.419*** 0.365
 Other response −1.688*** 0.384 −1.368*** 0.399
Intercept 3.542* 1.612 4.474** 1.478
SE: standard error; SF: Sinn Féin; SDLP: Social Democratic and Labour Party.
n = 1128.
cox and snell psuedo r-square = 0.61.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; and ***p < 0.001.
Note: the difference between SDLP and Alliance on morality is statistically significantly different at 0.001.
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Table A4: Factor Loadings (WhoGetsMyVoteUK, re-sampled)
Table A5: Factor Loadings (EUvox)
Table A6: Dimensionality of the Policy Space (EUvox), n = 2172
Table A7: Mokken Scale Analysis (WhoGetsMyVoteUK, full dataset)
Table A8: Mokken Scale Analysis (WhoGetsMyVoteUK, re-sampled)
Table A9: Mokken Scale Analysis (EUvox)
Table A10a: Dimensionality of the Policy Space (WhoGetsMyVoteUK): Less politically attentive users 
(attention to politics 6 or less), n = 3024
Table A10b: Dimensionality of the Policy Space (WhoGetsMyVoteUK): Users who left school at the age of 
19 years or before, n = 1504
Table A10c: Dimensionality of the Policy Space (WhoGetsMyVoteUK): Users aged 35 years and over, 
n = 2086
Table 11a: Mokken Scale Analysis Applied to the Four Policy Dimensions (WhoGetsMyVoteUK): Less 
politically attentive users (attention to politics 6 or less), n = 3024
Table A11b: Mokken Scale Analysis Applied to the Four Policy Dimensions: Users who left school at the 
age of 19 years or before (WhoGetsMyVoteUK), n = 1504
Table A11c: Mokken Scale Analysis Applied to the Four Policy Dimensions (WhoGetsMyVoteUK): Users 
aged 35 years and over, n = 2086
Figure A1: WhoGetsMyVote (full dataset)
Figure A2: WhoGetsMyVote (re-sampled)
Figure A3: EUvox (full dataset)
Notes
 1. Proponents of consociation include Lijphart (1969, 1977, 2004) and McGarry and O’Leary (2004) and 
opponents include Horowitz (1985, 2014). See a debate from a range of contributors in Taylor (2009).
 2. See discussion in Garry (2009) and on the general incentives to moderate see Tonge and Evans (2009: 1028).
 3. See Mitchell et al. (2009) on the implications for party competition of arriving at a consociational settle-
ment and generating an inclusive power-sharing government.
 4. Northern Ireland is, here, used as an illustrative example of a post-violent conflict consociational polity 
and is particularly useful as a case given that Northern Ireland is often cited as a ‘model’ to follow for other 
places suffering violent ethnic conflict (Wilson, 2010).
 5. On the potential of future voting across the divide, see Garry (2014).
 6. Northern Ireland is a consociational democracy with a power-sharing executive and assembly elected via 
proportional representation. All five parties analysed – the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), Sinn Féin, 
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Alliance – were repre-
sented in the executive at the time of data collection. These parties are typically characterised in terms 
of their position on the ethno-national dimension stretching from very strong unionist (DUP), unionist 
(UUP), bi-communal (Alliance), nationalist (SDLP) and strongly nationalist (Sinn Féin). See discussion 
in Mitchell et al. (2009).
 7. In the British case, see Tilley (2005).
 8. Our analysis is hence a single case study at a particular point in time. Absence of directly comparable 
data means an over-time longitudinal analysis is not possible. As described earlier, Northern Ireland is an 
exemplary case of post-violent conflict consociational power sharing and hence we focus on this single 
case rather than engaging in a comparative analysis.
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 9. ‘Neither agree nor disagree’ and ‘no opinion’ were provided as separate response categories, with the for-
mer response located between ‘agree and disagree’ in the visual display and the latter placed, separately, 
below the other five responses. This is because ‘no opinion’ was intended to indicate a lack of interest or 
knowledge of the issue, while ‘neither agree nor disagree’ was intended to represent a middle position. 
Psychological research into the behaviour of voter advice application (VAA) users suggests that users do 
indeed evaluate these two response categories as separate (Baka et al., 2012).
10. For the party affiliation and vote intention questions, the options ‘none’ and ‘undecided’ were available.
11. The goodness-of-fit indicators we choose are that the comparative fit index (CFI) should be at least 0.95, 
the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) at least 0.94 and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
equal to or below 0.08.
12. To the question ‘On a scale of 0 to 10, how much attention do you generally pay to politics?’, these users 
positioned themselves from 0 to 6.
13. Density maps are generated in such a way that each contour line encloses areas in which the density 
of users is greater than outside. The 50% contour line is identified using the Two-Dimensional Kernel 
Density Estimation function in the R-package MASS (Venables and Ripley, 2002).
14. While the absence of a left-right effect may seem remarkable from a comparative perspective, as described 
in review of the Northern Ireland literature earlier, it is not so surprising.
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Appendix A1. Issue Statements in the WhoGetsMyVoteUK VAA.
Item no. Item
1 Government spending should be cut further in order to balance the budget.
2 A ‘mansion tax’ should be levied on high-value residential properties.
3 Inheritance tax should be abolished.
4 The top rate of income tax should be reduced.
5 Stormont should block the introduction of what is commonly known as the 
‘bedroom tax’ on under-occupied social homes.
6 Private sector involvement in the National Health Service (NHS) should be reduced.
7 The government should allow the extraction of underground shale gas (fracking).
8 The option of imprisonment should be retained for the possession of drugs, including 
for personal consumption.
9 Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.
10 Same-sex and heterosexual couples should enjoy the same rights to marry.
11 Doctors should be allowed to help terminally ill patients to die if they so wish.
12 Northern Ireland should be more confident about its Christian heritage.
13 For social housing, priority should be given to people whose parents and 
grandparents were born locally.
14 Post-primary schools in Northern Ireland should be able to select pupils according to 
ability.
15 University tuition fees should be scrapped.
16 The United Kingdom should remain within the European Union.
17 A single EU member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the 
other member states agree to it.
18 The United Kingdom should take a tougher line over Russian involvement in Ukraine.
19 The United Kingdom should maintain its support to developing countries through 
foreign aid.
20 The United Kingdom should be able to restrict the number of EU immigrants 
entering the country.
21 The United Kingdom should welcome a larger number of asylum seekers from war-
torn countries.
22 State benefits should only be available to those who have lived in the United Kingdom 
for at least 5 years.
23 Young people should be given the right to vote at the age of 16 years.
24 The United Kingdom should withdraw from the European Convention on Human 
Rights.
25 Northern Ireland should become part of a United Ireland.
26 The IRA’s violent campaign during the Troubles was totally unacceptable and always 
wrong.
27 There should be strict limits on the number of days the Union flag can be flown on 
public buildings.
28 Parades should only be allowed after talks between marchers and residents.
29 Those convicted of Troubles-related terrorist offences should be regarded as 
‘victims’ of the conflict.
30 Businesses should be allowed to refuse custom to those who hold views contrary to 
their religious faith.
